Modern networks achieve robustness and scalability by maintaining states on their nodes. ese nodes are referred to as middleboxes and are essential for network functionality. However, the presence of middleboxes drastically complicates the task of network veri cation.
INTRODUCTION
Modern computer networks are extremely complex, leading to many bugs and vulnerabilities that a ect our daily life. erefore, network veri cation is an increasingly important topic addressed by the programming languages and networking communities Foster et al. 2015; Kazemian et al. 2013 Kazemian et al. , 2012 Khurshid et al. 2012; Kuzniar et al. 2012; Nelson et al. 2014; Sethi et al. 2013) . Previous network veri cation tools leverage a simple network forwarding model, which renders the datapath immutable. at is, normal packets going through the network do not change its forwarding behaviour, and the control plane explicitly alters the forwarding state at relatively slow time scales.
While the notion of an immutable datapath supported by an assemblage of routers makes veri cation tractable, it does not re ect reality. Middleboxes are widespread in modern enterprise networks (Sherry et al. 2012) . A simple example of a middlebox is a stateful rewall which permits tra c from untrusted hosts only a er they have received a packet from a trusted host. Middleboxes, such as rewalls, WAN optimizers, transcoders, proxies, load-balancers and the like, are the most common way to insert new functionality in the network datapath, and are commonly used to improve network performance and security. Middleboxes maintain a state and may change their state and forwarding behavior (a) A middlebox chain with a correct topology.
(b) A middlebox chain with a buggy topology. Summarizing Packet E ects. e network-level Cartesian abstraction leads to an abstract interpretation algorithm that is polynomial in the state space of each middlebox. However, the number of middlebox states can be exponential in the size of the network. For example, a rewall may record the set of trusted hosts and thus its states are subsets of hosts. erefore, network-level Cartesian abstraction leads to an algorithm that is exponential in the number of hosts and thus will not scale.
In order to realize the middlebox-level Cartesian abstraction and reduce the complexity of abstract interpretation, we rst identify a bisimilar representation of middlebox states, which records the state queries in the AMDL code that match a given input packet. us, in this representation, each packet is mapped into its recorded behavior (packet state). Applying a middlebox-level Cartesian abstraction on this representation results in an abstract interpretation algorithm that enumerates, for each middlebox, the forwarding behavior of individual packets separately (based on their headers), instead of enumerating (entire) middlebox reachable states.
We show that the abstract interpretation algorithm can be realized the with packet state representation in time that is polynomial in the size of the network and packet-header space, albeit exponential in the maximal number of distinct state queries in the AMDL code of an individual middlebox. State queries capture the dependency of the middlebox behavior on its state. For example, a state query could check whether the source of the current packet was seen in the past. We note that, even for complex middleboxes, our model requires a small number of distinct state queries. In all of our examples, the maximal number of state queries is 5.
Empirical Evaluation. We have implemented our algorithm and applied it to several interesting topologies (Sec. 6).
Our implementation was able to detect, for example, the safety violation described in Fig. 1 . e gure shows an example of correct and incorrect middlebox chains. e safety property is: low security hosts (l 1 , . . . , l m ) do not receive packets from the S h server. Fig. 1b contains an incorrect network con guration, where the cache may respond with a stored packet, bypassing the security policy enforced by the rewall. e rewall here records trusted hosts and permits forwarding packets from trusted hosts. Since our implementation is sound, it is guaranteed not to miss any error and in particular spots the error in Fig. 1b . More interestingly, it guarantees that the network shown in Fig. 1a is safe (even when unbounded number of packets are sent).
We evaluate the scalability of our approach under two scenarios: (a) we vary the number of middleboxes in the network; and (b) we vary the number of hosts connected to a network. Our algorithm veri ed networks with thousands of hosts, and with hundreds of middleboxes in timescales of hours, suggesting that our approach can be used to verify safety in real-world examples.
Reverting Network Semantics. One of the biggest hurdles in adapting abstract interpretation is false alarms. erefore, we identi ed a property that is applicable to many networks and which guarantees the absence of false alarms. A middlebox is reverting if from every state it can reset to its initial state. Notice that resets are similar to so network states (Lui et al. 2004) , and could be triggered, e.g., by session timeouts or hardware failures.
We show that Cartesian abstraction does not incur a loss of precision on reverting networks. In other words, the only potential loss of precision by abstraction is due to ignoring the order of packet arrivals. Unfortunately, for non-reverting networks and safety properties, our method might be imprecise, e.g., when the safety property involves counting the number of packets and for temporal properties.
Lower-Bounds. We show that our abstractions are essential for scalability by showing several lower bounds.
First, we show that it is undecidable to check the safety of reverting networks when packet order is respected, i.e., channels have a FIFO behavior. is justi es ignoring order of packet arrival, which is a simple and useful network abstraction. Second, we show that the complexity of checking safety in middleboxes is coNP-hard, even with unordered reverting semantics. Hence, the exponential dependency of the algorithm on the number of state queries is, in general, inevitable.
Limitations. While our approach enables scalable veri cation for a variety of networks, it has a few limitations. First, our veri cation time grows exponentially with the number of state queries. is means that the running time grows exponentially with the amount of state that a middlebox must access. In practice, middleboxes access a limited amount of state per packet so as to minimize their working-set size. Hence, this does not signi cantly limit our applicability.
Second, we rely on abstract packet models; this limits the accuracy with which we can model middleboxes, e.g., intrusion detection systems that search for byte pa erns in the packet payload, etc. Finally, for technical reasons, we model safety properties by middlebox. erefore, history-sensitive properties such as "a message with property x can only be sent a er a message with property has been sent", cannot always be proved with our method. We notice that for many properties, including network isolation, our method is precise (technically, our method is complete for the class of revert-robust properties (Sec. 5.3). We note that in practice, our analysis may still be able to prove safety, even in cases where the property is not revert-robust; our experiments include an example (enterprise network) where safety depends on a property that is not revert-robust, which our analysis is still able to prove.
We defer proofs of key claims to the App. A .
OVERVIEW
is section provides an informal overview of our approach. Fig. 2b shows a simple network where two stateful rewalls are connected in a row to prevent tra c between nodes h 2 to h 1 . is is an arti cial example meant to illustrate the veri cation process. More realistic examples are presented in Sec. 6. It is assumed that hosts h 1 and h 2 can send and receive arbitrary packets on channels e 1 and e 4 , respectively. e example is implemented using three middleboxes: two middleboxes, fw 1 and fw 2 , running rewalls that restrict tra c from le to right and from right to le , respectively, and one middlebox, is, checking whether isolation between h 2 and h 1 is preserved. In fw 1 , e 2 is connected to the "internal" port and e 3 is connected to the "external" port, thus limiting tra c from right to le . In fw 2 , e 4 is connected to the "internal" port and e 3 is connected to the "external" port, thus limiting tra c from le to right. In is, e 1 is connected to the "internal" port and e 2 is connected to the "external" port. Fig. 2a describes the code running in either of the session rewalls, fw 1 and fw 2 . We use CSP/OCCAM-like syntax where (messages) packets are sent/received asynchronously. e middlebox non-deterministically operates on a packet from the "internal" port or the "external" port. When reading a packet from the "internal" port, the program distinguishes between two cases. In the rst case, a session had been previously established, and the packet is simply forwarded to the "external" port. In the second case the type of the packet is a "request" packet (type=0), and the program adds the destination host to the set of requested hosts and forwards the "request". e requested set is used to store the hosts to which the middlebox sent a "request" packet, to avoid the case where a session is established with a host that the middlebox did not send a "request" to. Packets that do not fall into any of these two cases are discarded with no further processing.
A Running Example
When the middlebox reads a packet from the "external" port again it distinguishes between two cases -in one case a session had previously been established, and is similar to its "internal" counterpart. In the second case, the processed packet is a "response" packet (type=1) from a host that is in the requested set, and the program marks the source of the packet as trusted, thus establishing a session. Other packets are discarded.
A "data" packet (type=2) is implicitly handled by checking whether the source/destination of the packet is in the trusted set, and if so, allowing the packet to propagate on. Fig. 2c describes the code running in a special middlebox, is, which intercepts packets before they arrive to host h 1the middlebox non-deterministically reads a packet from the "external" port and aborts if the source of the packet is the host forbidden = h 2 , and otherwise forwards to h 1 on the "internal" port. On the other direction, it simply forwards packets from the "internal" port to the "external" port. In this example, is models the safety property.
Modular Network Verification
Unfortunately, as shown by Velner et al. (2016) , the complexity of checking safety is hard even when the order of packets on channels is ignored. e complexity stems from the potential interactions between states of middleboxes and received packets.
In this paper, we suggest the rst fully automatic modular method for verifying safety of stateful networks. Technically, it is a Cartesian abstract interpretation (Cousot and Cousot 1979; Flanagan et al. 2005; Hoenicke et al. 2017 
fw 2 reads p (2, 1, 1) fw 2 reads p (2, 1, 2) fw 1 reads p (2, 1, 0) fw 2 reads p (1, 2, 0) We rst explain our network-level abstractions. Our method abstracts away correlations between the local states of individual middleboxes and the contents of the individual channels. In addition, the contents of channels are abstractly represented as sets of packets (rather than sequences). Channel abstract states are sets of packets.
For the rewall middleboxes, a (concrete) state is a pair of values for the requested and trusted sets. An abstract state is a set of such (concrete) states. e isolation middlebox is stateless.
At the initial con guration, the states of fw 1 and fw 2 are pairs of empty sets; the states of channels → e 1 and ← e 4 are all the packets that hosts h 1 and h 2 can send, respectively. e analysis ignores the correlations between di erent columns. At each step, the analysis chooses an input channel and a middlebox state and computes the next state. e analysis stops when no more new middlebox states or channel states are discovered and reports potential violation of the safety property if the abort command is executed.
Reasoning about Cartesian Abstractions
e abstract transformer (Cousot and Cousot 1979 ) obtained by the network-level abstraction discussed so far can be computed on the y by: (1) computing the sets of con gurations represented by a given input channel and current set of states, (2) applying middlebox code to each potential packet in the set and each state, and then ( Notice that in this example, the analysis proved that the abort command can ever be executed on arbitrary packet propagation scenarios. Speci cally, no packets ever reaches channel ← e 2 , so the safety middlebox is never reads a packet that will result in the execution of an abort command. us, the analysis succeeded in proving isolation.
is example illustrates that, although our analysis employs Cartesian abstraction, it is able to prove a network-wide property. Speci cally, proving isolation requires reasoning about the states of both rewalls. We note that removing either of the rewalls violates the safety property.
Reverting Systems
Our network-wide modular veri cation may fail to prove safety for systems in which the safety depends on correlated states. erefore, we tried to characterize the systems in which Cartesian abstraction does not lose information. One class of systems for which this Cartesian abstraction does not lose precision is the class of Reverting Systems, which bares some similarity with the notion of so states in networks (Raman and McCanne 1999) . A reverting system is a system in which every middlebox may non-deterministically revert to its initial state at any point in time.
We show that in reverting systems where, in addition, packets are processed in an arbitrary order, if a packet is received at some middlebox state, it can be received when that middlebox is at any reachable state. is allows us to prove that the Cartesian abstraction is precise for reverting systems with unordered channels.
In the example presented in Fig. 2b the Cartesian abstraction is precise w.r.t. to the safety property. e network in the example is safe, and indeed, even if we add revert transitions to the network, there is no history in the network that leads to executing an abort command. Intuitively, this is because a er one of the rewalls in our example reverts to its initial state, its forwarding behavior can only "shrink", so a er the revert it will return to a state in which it can only send "request" packets to the "external" port and no packets to the "internal" port. In our example, the only way a rewall would permit a packet from h 2 to reach h 1 is if a "response" packet had been sent beforehand, which cannot happen in the network, regardless of whether the rewalls revert to their initial state or not.
Packet State for Polynomial Safety Checking. e complexity of checking safety with the network-level Cartesian abstraction is polynomial in the number of middlebox states. However, the number of middlebox states is exponential in the number of hosts in the system, which means that it will be hard to scale this approach to realistic systems with a large number of hosts. For example, in the case of rewalls with potentially k trusted hosts, the number of states is 2 k .
To deal with the explosion that arises from the state-space of the middleboxes, we employ a middlebox-level abstraction. We observe that the middlebox behavior for many real middleboxes can be expressed in a way that makes veri cation tractable. e idea is that middlebox behavior is local in the following way: we can view a single middlebox state as a mapping from packets to their packet states, where the packet state of p su ces to determine both the sequence of packets that the middlebox outputs when it receives p as an input packet, and the way the state changes in response to p. Formally, this de nes a bisimilar representation of the middlebox states, which is facilitated by our language for describing middleboxes.
In Sec. 3, we de ne a simple programming language -Abstract Middlebox De nition Languge (AMDL) -for de ning the e ect of middleboxes. Intuitively, we restrict the ability of the middlebox to generate new packets. e code can only rewrite packets using values of the current processed packet or con guration constants. For example, swapping source and destination is allowed but adding one to destination is forbidden. e e ect of a packet on the state is restricted in a similar way. We show that the e ect of many interesting middleboxes can be de ned in this language.
In Sec. 5 we utilize AMDL for de ning a novel (e ectively) polynomial-time modular veri cation, which performs Cartesian abstraction using the packet state representation for middlebox states. Instead of tracking middlebox states as valuations of relations, the algorithm tracks, for each packet header, the potential packet states. Technically, packet states are the valuations of the Boolean conditions in the code (also code state queries) that match the packet. Each of these valuations uniquely determines the potential forwarded packets and new state.
Example 2.3. Tab. 2 shows the veri cation process with packet states in the running example. Instead of storing the contents of relations trusted and requested in each middlebox state, we store, for each packet, whether each of the expressions "p.dst in trusted", "p.src in trusted", and "p.src in requested", evaluates to True (T ) or False (F ), respectively.
Since both relations are empty in the initial state, the packet states for both rewalls map each packet to (F , F , F ).
Recall that when fw 1 reads (h 1 , h 2 , 0) from → e 2 , it forwards it to → e 3 and reaches a new state with requested = {h 2 } and trusted = ∅. erefore, any future evaluation of the expression "p.src in requested" (for any value of type)
should result in True. Under the packet state representation, this would result in adding to the abstract state of fw 1 a packet state similar to that of the initial state where each of the packets p (2,1,0) , p (2,1,1) , and p (2,1,2) is re-mapped from (F , F , F ) to (F , F ,T ). Our middlebox-level Cartesian abstraction allows us to instead accumulate these mappings (separated by a horizontal line from the initial mappings) in a single abstract state, without a ecting the overall precision of the abstract interpretation.
A similar change to the packet state of fw 2 occurs upon reading the packet (h 2 , h 1 , 0) from ← e 4 . e size of the packet state space is quadratic in the number of hosts, and exponential in the number of Boolean conditions that examine relations in the code. e la er is typically a constant (three, in our example), which gives us a polynomial time algorithm for safety checking. Also, for reverting unordered networks, the algorithm does not lose precision with respect to the middlebox state enumeration. Hence it is also precise for such networks. Fig. 3 provides a high-level view of the di erent (abstract) semantics introduced in the sequel.
EXPRESSING MIDDLEBOX EFFECTS
is section de nes our programming language for modeling the abstract behavior of middleboxes in the network. e proposed language, AMDL (Abstract Middlebox De nition Language), is a restricted form of OCCAM (Roscoe and Hoare 1988) .
Middleboxes are implemented as reactive processes. Middleboxes can have states realized using relations; they read a packet and consequently produce and send new packets, and potentially change the state of the process. For example, the code for the session rewall is depicted in Fig. 2a .
fw 2 reads p (2, 1, 1) fw 2 reads p (2, 1, 2) fw 1 reads p (2, 1, 0) fw 2 reads p (1, 2, 0) Table 2 . Packet state enumeration for the running example. The abstract states of channels are sets of packets. The abstract states of middleboxes are relations over packets and query valuations; each entry in the table is denoted by →. Each cell in the table represent a set of the elements described within, except for empty sets in the initial state. The horizontal lines in the fw 1 and fw 2 columns appear to emphasize the changes. As before, p (i, j,k ) stands for the packet from h i to h j with type k. e structure of AMDL processes is that of an event loop that non-deterministically reads a packet from one of the incoming channels of the process. e packet processing code is a loop-free block of guarded-commands. e only data structures allowed in AMDL are relations over nite domains, and the only relation operations allowed are inserting a value to a relation, removing a value from a relation, and checking whether a value is in a relation. To report a failure, the middlebox executes the abort command. Our modeling language is independent of the particular network topology, which is de ned in Sec. 4.
Packet Headers. A packet p ∈ P consists of a header only in the form of a tuple of packet elds over prede ned nite sorts. erefore, middlebox behavior in our model is de ned with respect to the packet headers and is oblivious to the payload on the packets. In our examples, a packet is a tuple s, d, t , where s, d are the source and destination hosts, respectively, taken from a nite set of hosts H (h 1 , h 2 in the running example) and t is a packet tag (or type) that ranges over a nite domain T ({0, 1, 2} in the running example). In this case, |P | is polynomial in |H |.
Cartesian network domain over Cartesian packet space domain: e rest of this section is as follows: We rst de ne the syntax and informal semantics of AMDL (Sec. 3.1); we then de ne a formal "standard" relation e ect semantics (Sec. 3.2); we continue by de ning an alternative packet e ect semantics (Sec. 3.3), which is bisimilar to the relation e ect semantics (Sec. 3.4); and nally we present a localized version of the packet e ect semantics (Sec. 3.5), which is suitable for Cartesian abstraction. Middleboxes may enforce safety properties using the abort command. e semantics of each middlebox consists of non-deterministic actions that react to packet arrivals. e middlebox de nes updates to its state and forwards potentially modi ed packets to some of its output ports.
Middlebox abstraction Network abstraction

Syntax and Informal Semantics
When several packets can be read, one of them is chosen non-deterministically. If no packets are read, the process blocks until a packet arrives. When a packet is handled by the middlebox, it is taken from its input channel and the output packets are added to the output channels.
Middlebox Relation E ect Semantics
We now sketch the semantics of AMDL. Intuitively, every middlebox enforces a safety property by forbidding certain packets in certain states, and potentially updating the relations and outpu ing packets. e de nitions below supply a part of the full network semantics, which is given in Sec. 4.
Middlebox States. Each middlebox m ∈ M maintains its own local state as a set of relations.
mbox
::= true | cond and cond | not cond | atom = atom | atom in r atom ::= p d | const Fig. 4 . AMDL syntax. e denotes a comma-separated list of elements drawn from the domain e. The command abort imposes a safety condition. The command c ? p reads p from a channel c and c ! p writes p into c. We write m for a middlebox name, mainly for explanatory purposes. We write const for a constant symbol. We write r for the name of a relation and c for the name of a channel. We write pfld to for identifiers used to match fields in packet headers, e.g., source, and destination. We use guarded commands with non-determinism denoted by . We allow standard Boolean operators with membership tests on relations.
e domain of a relation r de ned over sorts
For a middlebox m ∈ M we use rels(m) to denote the set of relations used in m, and D(m) to denote the union of D(r )
In addition, we introduce a unique error middlebox state, denoted err. We assume that err ∈ Σ R [m] for every middlebox m.
Example 3.1. In the running example, the corresponding de nitions for the rewall middleboxes are as follows:
Middlebox transitions have the form
.k is the sequence of packet-channel pairs that the middlebox outputs. e formal de nition of the middlebox transitions appears in App. B.
Example 3.2. e rst action in Tab. 1 is due to the transition s
and output states are de ned as follows: 
Middlebox Packet E ect Semantics
We now present a semantics that is equivalent to the relation e ect semantics. e semantics is based on an alternative (yet isomorphic) representation of middlebox states, which facilitates a Cartesian abstraction that abstracts away correlations between packets in the same state.
Packet E ect Representation of Middlebox State.
Recall that in Sec. 3.1 we restrict the values that can be used in a middlebox program to either constants or the values of elds of the currently processed packet. We do not allow reading values stored in the relations of middlebox states. Consequently, instead of storing the contents of all relations, the state of the middlebox can be represented by mapping all potential packets in the network to their e ect on the middlebox. Speci cally, we map each packet and membership query in the program to whether that membership query will be evaluated to True when the program is executed on that packet.
For every middlebox m, we denote by Q(m) the set of membership queries in m's program. (We need not distinguish between di erent instances of the same query.) Each membership query q ∈ Q(m) is of the form a in r. We denote the relation, r, used in a query by rel(q) and denote the tuple of atoms a by atoms(q). Given a packet p ∈ P, we denote by atoms(q)(p) the result of substituting each eld name in atoms(q) by its value in p. Namely, atoms(q)(p) ∈ D(rel(q)).
Example 3.3. In Fig. 2a , we have the following: Tab. 2 shows the sets of (accumulated) packet states for each rewall.
Middlebox Transition Relation in the Packet
Space. e semantics of middlebox m in the packet space is de ned via a transition relation
. When m is clear, we omit it from the notation. A transitions 
Namely, the operation updates to True the value of queries that coincide with the tuple of elements inserted to the relation. 
, using the shorthand notations of Tab. 2.
Bisimulation of Packet E ect Semantics and Relation E ect Semantics
We continue by showing that the transition systems de ning the semantics of middleboxes in the packet e ect and in the relation e ect representations are bisimilar.
To do so, we rst de ne a mapping ps : 
at is, for every input packetp, the value in s p of the query q ∈ Q(m) is equal to the evaluation of the same query in s based on an input packetp.
De nition 3.6 (Bisimulation Relation). Let m be a middlebox. We de ne the relation
as the set of all pairs (s, s p ) such that either s = s p = err or Σ P (s) = s p . e relation ∼ m is a bisimulation relation over the corresponding transition systems.
and s ∼ mŝ . en the following holds:
Example 3.8. Considering Ex. 3.2 and Ex. 3.5, we have that s ∼ ms and s ∼ ms hold.
Locality of Middlebox Transitions
An execution of an operation r(a) :=cond, in the context of processing an input packet p, potentially updates the packet states of all packets. However, for each packetp, the updated packet states (p) depends only on its pre-states(p), the input channel c, the input packet p, ands(p), which determines the value of queries; it is completely independent of the packet states of all other packets. Since, in addition, the execution path of the middlebox when processing input packet p depends only on the packet state of p, this form of locality, which we formalize next, extends to entire middlebox programs as well.
Recall that each middlebox m is associated with a program, prog(m), given by an abstract syntax tree (AST). An evaluation of a program prog(m), for a given input packet, is performed by a single recursive traversal of the AST (as there are no looping constructs) where some of the branches non-deterministically choose a child node. We can make the evaluation deterministic by adding a vectorn ∈ N * as a parameter, to indicate the child nodes to be taken at non-deterministic branches. e vector is taken from the nite set paths(m)
We writes Example 3.9. In the previous example, the transition froms tos follows the pathn = 1, 2.
De nition 3.10 (Substate). Lets ∈ P → Q(m) → {True, False} be a packet e ect state. We denote bys | {p,p } ∈ {p,p} → Q(m) → {True, False} the substate obtained froms by dropping all packet states other than those of p andp.
False} denote the set of substates for a pair of packets p andp.
Example 3.11. Consider the statess ands used in Ex. 3.5 and the packets p = (h 1 , h 2 , 0) andp = (h 2 , h 1 , 0). en, using the shorthand notations of Tab. 2, we have the following:
De nition 3.12 (Substate transition relation). We de ne the substate transition relation 
Example 3.13. Continuing with the de nitions in Ex. 3.11 andn = 1, 2, we have the following substate transition for
Notice that in this case, since no query was made, the output substate is obtained by propagating the packet state of p and updating the packet state ofp, independent of any other packet states.
De nition 3.14 (2-Local Middlebox Semantics). A middlebox semantics is 2-local if, for every packet p, the following holds:s Furthermore, the substate transition relation, p,p] , can be computed directly from the code (without rst computing the transition relation and then using projection) in time linear in the size of the middlebox program. is is an even stronger notion of locality, which will be important later to e ciently compute a network-level abstract transformer (Sec. 5.1).
NETWORK SEMANTICS
is section de nes the semantics of stateful networks by de ning the semantics of packet traversal over communication channels in the network, and the transitions between network con gurations. We rst de ne a concrete semantics, followed by two relaxations: unordered semantics and reverting semantics. ese relaxations provide su cient conditions for completeness of the abstract interpretation performed in Sec. 5.
Network Topology. A network N is a nite bidirected graph of hosts and middleboxes, equipped with a packet domain.
Formally, N = (H ∪ M, E, P), where H is a nite set of hosts, M is a nite set of middleboxes, P is a set of packets, and 
is can be realized with either the relation e ect semantics or the packet e ect semantics de ned in Sec. 3.2 and Sec. 3.3, respectively.
Safety. Safety properties are expressed by middleboxes that might transition to an error state.
Concrete (Ordered) Network Configurations
All variants of the network semantics de ned in this section are de ned over the same set of con gurations. Let and not yet processed by the destination.
Initial Con guration. We denote the ordered initial con guration by
the initial state of all middleboxes.
Error Con gurations. We say that a con guration is an error con guration if any of its middleboxes is in the error state. With slight abuse of notation, we denote all error con gurations by err.
Concrete (FIFO) Network Semantics
We rst consider the First-In-First-Out (FIFO) network semantics, under which communication channels retain the order in which packets were sent. e semantics is de ned via middlebox transitions and host transitions.
Ordered Network Transitions. We de ne the semantics of a middlebox transition in the network as (σ , π )
p,e,m = ==== ⇒ o (σ , π ) where the following holds: (i) p is the rst packet on the channel e ∈ E, (ii) the channel e is an ingress channel
is the result of updating σ (m) according to the middlebox semantics, (iv) the channels e i are egress channels of middlebox m connected to the channels c i ∈ C m , (v) π is the result of removing packet p from (the head of) channel e and appending p i to the tails of the appropriate channels e i , and (vi) the states of all other middleboxes equal their states in σ .
We also de ne host transitions as (σ , π )
h,e,p ====⇒ o (σ , π ) where either one of the following conditions hold:
Packet Production (i) the channel e is an egress channel of host h, (ii) p is a packet generated by h, and (iii) π is the result of appending p to the tail of e; or Packet Consumption (i) the channel e is an ingress channel of host h, (ii) p is the rst packet on the channel e, and (iii) π is the result of removing p from the head of e.
We denote the ordered transition relation obtained by the union of all middlebox and host transitions by = ⇒ o .
It is naturally li ed to a concrete transformer T o : ℘(Σ) → ℘(Σ) de ned as:
Collecting Semantics. e ordered collecting semantics of a network N is the set of con gurations reachable from the initial con guration.
De nition 4.1 (Safety Veri cation Problem). For a network N and initial state σ I for the middleboxes, the safety veri cation problem is to determine whether an error con guration is reachable from the initial con guration (σ I , λ e ∈ E . ϵ). at is, whether err ∈ N o . In this work, we develop a sound abstract interpretation that can be used to check the safety of networks. Before doing so, we present two relaxed network semantics that motivate the abstractions we employ, and also provide su cient conditions for their completeness.
Unordered Network Semantics
e rst relaxed semantics that we de ne allows channels not to preserve the packet transmission order. Namely, packets in the same channel may be processed in a di erent order than the order in which they were received.
Unordered Network Transitions. e unordered network semantics is given by the transitions (σ , π ) p,e,m
where all conditions are as in the case of ordered transitions, with the exception of condition (i) that changes as follows:
(i) p is some packet on the channel e ∈ E. Namely, a transition can be triggered by any packet on the ingress channel of a middlebox. Host transitions remain unchanged. e transformer, the collecting semantics, denoted N u , as well as the safety veri cation problem for unordered networks are de ned similarly to the ordered case. 
Reverting Network Semantics
e next relaxed semantics that we consider allows middleboxes to revert to their initial state a er every transition.
Reverting Network Transitions. e ordered reverting network semantics is given by the transitions (σ , π ) p,e,m = ==== ⇒ or (σ , π ), where all conditions are as in the case of ordered transitions, with the exception of condition (iii) that changes as follows: (iii) σ (m)
, meaning that the middlebox m may revert to its initial state. e unordered reverting network semantics is de ned similarly; the corresponding transitions are denoted (σ , π ) p,e,m = ==== ⇒ ur (σ , π ). In both cases, host transitions remain unchanged. e transformers and the collecting semantics are de ned as before. We denote by N or the collecting ordered reverting semantics and by N ur the collecting unordered reverting semantics. e safety veri cation problem for these cases is adapted accordingly.
T 4.4. e safety veri cation problem for ordered reverting networks is undecidable.
T 4.5. e safety problem for unordered reverting networks is coNP-hard.
In Sec. 5, we present an abstract interpretation algorithm that is both sound and complete for the unordered reverting semantics, and essentially meets the lower bound stated in eorem 4.5, as it is exponential in the number of state queries of any middlebox and polynomial in the number of middleboxes, hosts and packets.
Sticky Properties. Unordered reverting networks have two useful properties, which we de ne next -the sticky states property and the sticky packets property -that make the abstract interpretation described in Sec. 5 complete.
L 4.6 (S P P ). For every channel e and packet p: If in some reachable con guration e contains p, then every run can be extended such that e will eventually contain p. Moreover, every run can be extended such that e will eventually contain n copies of p (for every n > 0). e sticky packets property implies that, in verifying such networks, it is not necessary to maintain the cardinality of every packet on every channel and it is not necessary to maintain the correlation between a channel and the set of packets that can simultaneously appear there. Instead, it is su cient to record, for each individual channel e and individual packet p, whether p has arrived on p at some point, without losing precision w.r.t. safety. L 4.7 (S S P ). For every channel e, packet p, middlebox m and state s of m: If, in some reachable con guration, channel e contains p and in some (possibly other) reachable con guration m is in state s, then there exists a reachable con guration where simultaneously e contains p and m is in state s. e sticky states property ensures that ignoring the correlation between the state of a middlebox m and the channels connected to it does not incur any precision loss w.r.t. safety. is implies that one can also ignore correlations between the states of di erent middleboxes, making the network-level Cartesian abstraction de ned in Sec. 5 precise. e sticky properties formulated above are oblivious of the middlebox semantics. For the case of the packet state representation of the middlebox semantics, an even ner variant of the sticky states property of reverting unordered networks arises, which implies precision of the middlebox-level Cartesian abstraction de ned in Sec. 5: L 4.8 (S P S P ). For every channel e, packets p,p, middlebox m and packet state˜ ofp in m: If, in some reachable con guration, channel e contains p and in some (possibly other) reachable con guration the packet state ofp in m is˜ , then there exists a reachable con guration where simultaneously e contains p and the packet state ofp in m is˜ .
P
. Follows directly from Lem. 4.7 and from the bisimulation between the relation state space and the packet state space of middleboxes.
Intuitively, Lem. 4.6, Lem. 4.7 and Lem. 4.8 follow from the fact that all middleboxes can revert to their initial state and the unordered semantics enables a scenario where the particular state and packets are reconstructed.
Summary of the Di erent Semantics and their Relations
We have de ned four variants of the network transitions over concrete ordered con gurations, where both
hold (o stands for "ordered", u stands for "unordered" and r stands for "reverting".)
By plugging-in the two representations of middleboxes in the de nition of the network semantics, we obtain two variants of the network semantics for each of the four variants considered so far. In the sequel, we use a pa subscript to refer to the packet e ect semantics, and no subscript to refer to the relation e ect semantics. e bisimulation between middlebox representations is li ed to a bisimulation between each relation state network semantics and the corresponding packet state network semantics. erefore, the following holds: 
ABSTRACT INTERPRETATION FOR STATEFUL NETWORKS
In this section, we present our algorithm for safety veri cation of stateful networks based on abstract interpretation. As demonstrated in Sec. 2, applying an order abstraction combined with Cartesian abstraction on the concrete network domain allows us to obtain a sound abstract interpretation which is polynomial in the number of middlebox states.
Unfortunately, the la er is o en exponential in the size of the packet space, which hinders scalability. However, when also employing Cartesian abstraction on the packet e ect representation of middlebox states, we obtain an abstract domain for which the time needed to compute the abstract least xpoint is polynomial in the number of packets and the number of middleboxes, but exponential in the maximal number of distinct state queries in the middlebox programs.
Further, the abstract interpretation is sound for any network, and complete for reverting unordered networks.
Abstract Interpretation for Packet Space
We now present our safety veri cation algorithm as an abstract interpretation of the semantics N o pa . (In fact, our algorithm is sound and complete for N ur pa ⊇ N o pa .)
We apply sound abstractions to di erent components of the concrete packet state network domain to obtain di erent abstract interpretations. e abstractions apply either to the channel contents, to the middlebox states, or to the correlations between these individual components.
Due to space constraints, we do not describe the intermediate steps in the construction of the abstract domain, and only present the nal domain used by the analysis. Roughly speaking, the obtained domain abstracts away (i) the order and cardinality of packets on channels; (ii) the correlation between the states of di erent middleboxes and di erent channel contents; and (iii) the correlation between states of di erent packets within each middlebox.
Cartesian Packet E ect Abstract Domain. Let Q → {T , F } denote the union of Q(m) → {T , F } over all middleboxes m ∈ M, including the error state err. e Cartesian abstract domain of the packet state of the network is given by the
. at is, an abstract element maps each packet in each middlebox to a set of possible valuations for the queries, and each channel to a set of packets. e bo om element is ⊥ def = (λm. λp. ∅, λe. ∅), the partial order a 1 a 2 is de ned by pointwise set inclusions per middlebox and channel, and join is de ned by pointwise unions (ω 1 , ω 2 ) (ω 1 , ω 2 ) = (λm. λp. ω 1 (m)(p) ∪ ω 1 (m)(p), λe. ω 2 (p) ∪ ω 2 (p)).
Let C def = (℘(Σ P ), ⊆) be the concrete network domain with the concrete transformer T o : ℘(Σ P ) → ℘(Σ P ). We de ne the Galois connection (C, γ , α, A) as follows. e abstraction function α : ℘(Σ P ) → A for a set of packet state con gurations X ⊆ Σ P is de ned as α(X ) = (ω mboxes , ω chans ) where ω mboxes = λm. λp. {σ (m)(p) | (σ , π ) ∈ X } and ω chans = λe.
(σ, π )∈X π (e) . e concretization function γ : A → ℘(Σ P ) is induced by α and . We denote the initial abstract element as a I = α(σ I , λ e ∈ E . ∅).
Abstract Transformer. Next, we de ne an abstract transformer T : A → A and show that it is e cient, due to the locality property of middlebox transitions. We use the predicate in(c, e, m) to denote that the network channel e is an ingress channel of middlebox m, connected to its c channel. Similarly, out(c, e, m) means that e is an egress channel of middlebox m connected to its c channel. Further, let [x 1 → 1 , . . . , x n → n ] denote a mapping from each x i to i for i = 1..n and f [x → ] denote the function f updated by mapping x to .
De nition 5.1. Let (ω 1 , ω 2 ) ∈ (M → P → ℘(Q → {T , F })) × (E → ℘(P)) be an abstract element. en
(2) p ∈ ω 2 (e), in(c, e, m), 
Intuitively, the transformer updates the abstract state by joining the individual e ects obtained by: (1) Abstract safety veri cation. As before, any abstract element in which one of the (sub)-components is err, is an error element.
De nition 5.3 (Abstract Safety Veri cation).
e abstract safety veri cation problem is to decide whether
Complexity of Least Fixpoint Computation. e height of the abstract domain la ice is determined by the number of packets that can be added to the channels of the network-(|P | · |E|), multiplied by the number of state changes that can occur in any of the middleboxes-O(|M | · |P | · 2 |Q | ). e time complexity of the abstract interpretation is bounded by the height of the abstract domain la ice multiplied by the time complexity of the abstract transformer:
O(|P | 4 · |E| · |M | · 2 3|Q max | · (|M | + |E|)) .
Soundness and Completeness
In the following, let µ def = LeastFixpoint(T )(a I ) denote the abstract least xpoint. e use of a sound abstract interpretation, ensures soundness of our algorithm w.r.t. concrete networks. In fact, we show soundness w.r.t. the unordered reverting semantics, which implies soundness w.r.t. the concrete (ordered non-reverting) semantics as well, as the collecting semantics of the la er is a subset of the former:
T 5.4 (S ). N ur pa ⊆ γ (µ ).
e above theorem, combined with the bisimulation between the relation state semantics and the packet state semantics, ensures that an error state is never missed by the analysis.
Our algorithm is also complete relative to the reverting unordered semantics.
T 5.5 (C ). µ α( N ur pa ).
e proof of m. 5.5 relies on the sticky property formalized by Lem. 4.8. e theorem states that for reverting unordered networks the abstract least xpoint is at least as precise as applying the abstraction function on the concrete packet state network semantics. In particular, this implies that if µ is an abstract error element then err ∈ N ur pa . Due to the bisimulation with the relation state representation, the same holds w.r.t. N ur (the collecting semantics over relation states). us, for such networks the analysis is precise w.r.t. safety properties.
Reverting Safety Properties
As summarized in eorem 5.5, our analysis is precise for unordered reverting networks. Recall that we express safety properties via middleboxes in the network. erefore, in unordered reverting networks, the possibility to revert applies to the safety property as well. As the reverting semantics adds transitions, this may increase the possible set of transitions of the safety middleboxes, and, in particular, may add transitions into an error state. For some temporal safety properties this is a source of imprecision as they cannot be precisely captured by the reverting semantics, thus introducing false alarms.
For example, if the safety property forbids a packet from host h ext to host h in before a packet from host h in has been sent to h ext , then in a reverting network, even if a packet from host h in has been previously sent to h ext , a revert transition allows the middlebox to return to its initial state, from which a packet from host h ext to host h in leads to an error state.
In the following, we provide a su cient condition for a safety property to be precisely expressible in a reverting network. To do so, we rst decouple the enforcement of safety from the forwarding behavior of the network. For this decoupling, in the sequel we consider safety middleboxes with a single output port that forwards any incoming packet (on any input port) to the output port without any modi cation. is ensures that safety middleboxes do not a ect the forwarding behavior of the network. In particular, the forwarding behavior of safety middleboxes does not depend on their state. e state is only used to enforce safety. For such safety middleboxes we de ne:
De nition 5.6. A safety middlebox m is revert-robust if for every sequence of input packets in = (p i , c i ) i=1..k , if no execution of m on in, starting from m's initial state, leads to err, then for every su x in of in, no execution of m on in starting from m's initial state leads to err as well.
Intuitively, revert-robustness means that the language of "safe" sequences of packets is su x-closed. For example, if the safety middlebox forbids a packet from host h ext to host h in a er a packet from host h in has been sent to h ext , then it is revert-robust. e reason is that, in this example, the "safe" input sequences are ones where no packet from host h ext to host h in has a preceding packet from host h in to h ext . erefore any su x of a safe input sequence is also safe.
As a result, such a safety middlebox will not introduce false alarms in a reverting network, as reverting transitions will just make the middlebox "forget" the pre x of the sequence. (Note that it will also not make the network wrongfully safe, as safety requires that all executions, including the ones that do not use revert transitions, are safe.)
Next, we claim that revert-robustness is a su cient condition for not losing precision of the analysis (i.e., not introducing false alarms) due to the revert transitions of the safety middlebox. In order to formalize this claim, we need the following de nitions. For a network N with a set of middleboxes M, a subset S ⊆ M, and a semantic identi er i ∈ {o, u, or, ur }, we denote by N i\S pa the corresponding network collecting semantics, with the exception that no reverting transitions are applied to the middleboxes in S (when applicable). We then have: is means that the network is safe (under any of the semantics) if and only if it is safe with the same semantics except that all safety middleboxes are non-reverting.
IMPLEMENTATION AND INITIAL EVALUATION
In this section, we describe our implementation of the analysis described in Sec. 5, and report our initial experience running the algorithm on a few example networks.
Implementation
We have developed a compiler, amdlc, which takes as input a network topology and its initial state (given in json format) and AMDL programs for the middleboxes that appear in the topology. e compiler outputs a Datalog program, which can then be e ciently solved by a Datalog solver. Speci cally, we use LogicBlox (Aref et al. 2015 ) is a state-of-the-art Datalog solver.
Datalog programs consist of facts (edb), and rules (idb). e facts in our Datalog program are the packets that hosts can send to their neighboring middleboxes, and the initial state of the middleboxes. e rules in our Datalog program describe the e ects of the middlebox programs. Our compiler generates rules corresponding to relation update actions and packet output actions. e generated Datalog programs include three relations: (i) packetsSeen, which stores the packets sent over the network channels; (ii) middleboxState, which stores the packet state of individual packets in each middlebox (i.e., the possible valuation of each middlebox program's queries for each individual packet); and (iii) abort, which stores the middleboxes that have reached an err state.
Evaluation
e main challenge in acquiring realistic benchmarks is that middlebox con guration and network topology are considered security sensitive, and as a result enterprises and network operators do not release this information to the public. Consequently, we benchmarked our tool using the synthetic topologies and con gurations described by Panda et al. (2017) . ese benchmarks were designed based on conversations with operators. We describe these benchmark cases below.
Our benchmarks focus on datacenter networks and enterprise networks. e set of middleboxes we used in our datacenter benchmarks were based on information provided in (Potharaju and Jain 2013) , and based on conversations with Amazon and other datacenter providers. We ran both a simple case where each tenant machine is protected by rewalls, and an IPS (Intrusion Prevention System); and a more complex case where we use redundant servers and distribute tra c across them using a load balancer. Our enterprise topology is based on the standard topology used in a variety of university departments including UIUC (reported in (Mai et al. 2011) ), UC Berkeley, Stanford, etc. which employ rewalls and an IP gateway.
We ran our implementation on a few network topologies, one of them synthetic and the rest inspired by real-world networks. Unfortunately, LogicBlox does not currently support magic set transformations (Bancilhon et al. 1986 ) and
does not optimize large relations (Whaley et al. 2005) . erefore, the running times of our tool can be drastically improved by a direct implementation of Chaotic iterations that employs incremental updates. e analysis of two of the networks was run multiple times, increasing the number of hosts in the network or the number of middleboxes in the network in each run, to test how well our analysis scales. We now describe the network topologies that were used in our experiments, and report the results of the scaling tests.
e scaling experiments were run on Amazon EC2 r4.16xlarge instances utilizing a 64-core Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2686 and 488GiB RAM, running Ubuntu 16.04.2 LTS and LogicBlox version 4.2.1.
Middlebox Chain. We tested our implementation on the networks illustrated in Fig. 1a and Fig. 1b . Our system found the con guration error in Fig. 1b , and successfully proved that the network in Fig. 1a is safe.
Session Firewalls. We tested our implementation on the network illustrated in the running example (Fig. 2b) . Our system successfully proved that the network is safe.
Multi Tenant Datacenter Network. Fig. 5 illustrates the topology of a multi tenant datacenter. Each rack hosts a di erent tenant, and the safety property we wish to verify is isolation between the hosts of the two racks. Isolation is enforced by an isolation middlebox connected to each rack. In this example the network also employs an IPS to prevent malicious tra c from reaching the datacenter. Actual IPS code is too complex to be accurately modeled in AMDL;
instead we over-approximate the behaviour of an IPS by modeling it as a process that non-deterministically drops some of the incoming packets. We successfully veri ed isolation in this network. Enterprise Network. Fig. 6a illustrates the topology of an enterprise network. e enterprise network consists of three subnets, each with a di erent security policy. e public subnet is allowed unrestricted access with the outside network.
e quarantined subnet is not allowed any communication with the outside network. e private subnet can initiate communication with a host in the outside network, but hosts in the outside network cannot initiate communication with the hosts in the private subnet.
Note that the private subnet security policy is not revert-robust, and consequently, our method can, in theory, fail to prove that the private subnet security policy is not violated. e quarantined subnet security policy, on the other hand, is revert-robust, and indeed our method successfully proves that it is not violated.
To evaluate the feasibility of our solution, we ran the analysis of Fig. 6a on networks with varying numbers of hosts ranging from 20 to 2,000. Our implementation successfully veri ed a network with 2,000 hosts in under four hours, suggesting that the implementation could be used to verify realistic networks. Fig. 6b shows the times of the analysis on an enterprise network with 20-2,000 hosts.
Datacenter Middlebox Pipeline. Figures 7a and 7b describe a datacenter topology with a pipeline of middleboxes connecting servers to the Internet. e topology contains multiple middlebox pipelines for load-balancing purposes and to ensure resiliency. We use this topology to test the scalability of our approach when we increase the network topology, by adding additional middlebox pipelines and keeping the number of hosts constant. Figure 7a illustrates a topology with two middlebox chains, whereas Figure 7b illustrates a topology with four middlebox chains. Note that in addition to the middleboxes shown in Figures 7a and 7b the network also contains switches, which were omi ed from the illustration. Fig. 7c shows the running times of the analysis of a datacenter with 3-189 middleboxes (1-32 middlebox chains). All topologies contained 1000 hosts.
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND RELATED WORK
In this paper, we applied abstract interpretation for e cient veri cation of networks with stateful nodes. We now brie y survey closely related works in this very active area.
Safety checking of general distributed systems. A general line of research looks at automatically verifying general distributed programs (Jhala and Majumdar 2007) . In this work it is natural to model programs as Petri Nets which can then be combined with CFA abstractions (D'Osualdo et al. 2013 ). AMDL does not support procedures and higher order programming. Also, we forbid nested loops inside middlebox code -and allow only outer loops that react to packets.
As a result our tool is e cient and can infer invariants in polynomial time. Investigating how AMDL can be generalized while continuing to provide polynomial time veri cation is le to future work. Topology Independent Network Veri cation. Early work in network veri cation focused on proving correctness of network protocols (Clarke et al. 1998; Ritchey and Ammann 2000) . Subsequent work in the context of so ware de ne networking (SDN) including Flowlog (Nelson et al. 2014) and VeriCon (Ball et al. 2014 ) looked at verifying the correctness of network applications (implemented as middleboxes or in network controllers) independent of the topology and con guration of the network where these were used. However, since this problem is undecidable, these methods use bounded model checking or user provided inductive invariants, which are hard to specify even in simple network topologies.
Verifying Immutable Network Con gurations. Verifying networks with immutable states is an active line of research (Anderson et al. 2014; Foster et al. 2015; Kazemian et al. 2013 Kazemian et al. , 2012 Khurshid et al. 2012; Mai et al. 2011; Sethi et al. 2013; Skowyra et al. 2013 ). In the future, we hope to combine our abstraction with the techniques used in these papers. We hope to use similar techniques to Veri ow (Khurshid et al. 2012 ) to handle switches more e ciently, and leverage compact header representation described in NetKat (Foster et al. 2015) .
Stateful Network Veri cation. Previous works provide useful tools for detecting errors in rewalls (Marmorstein and Kearns 2005; Mayer et al. 2000; Nelson et al. 2010) . Buzz (Fayaz et al. 2016) and SymNet (Stoenescu et al. 2016 ) have looked at how to use symbolic execution and packet generation for testing and verifying the behavior of stateful networks.
ese works implement testing techniques rather than verifying network behavior and are hence complementary to our approach.
Indeed, as observed by Velner et al. (2016) , the problem of checking safety in these networks is undecidable. erefore, we focus on overapproximations.
Velner et al. (2016) provide a general algorithm for checking safety using Petri nets. is algorithm has high complexity and scales poorly. Velner et al. (2016) also provides an e cient algorithm for middleboxes like Firewalls with increasing forwarding behaviors. One of the criticisms of their model is that it does not handle resets and that resets may decrease forwarding behavior. Also Henzinger et al. (2002) have observed that it is hard to synthesize reverting systems. A surprising observations in our work is that resets simplify the task of veri cation. Indeed, in this paper we presented a general polynomial algorithm for arbitrary middleboxes which overapproximates the behavior of the network and show it is precise for reverting networks.
Exploring Network Symmetry. Real network topologies contain a lot of symmetry (Namjoshi and Tre er 2013). erefore, it is promising to use bisimulation to drastically reduce the cost of network veri cation. is has been recently explored in stateless veri cation (Plotkin et al. 2016 ) and for stateful networks (Panda et al. 2017 ). Both of these approaches are not automatic. We are encouraged by the fact that our automatic approach achieves performance comparable to VMN (Panda et al. 2017) on the same examples without requiring human intervention. We a ribute this improvement to modularity and to the use of packet state representation.
In the future, we plan to generalize our approach to handle temporal properties and correlations between middlebox states. For this purpose, we may want to explore symmetries in the network topology. 
A PROOFS
In this section, we include proofs for some of the key claims made in the paper. P T . 4.4. It is well known that an automaton with an ordered channel of messages (also known as a channel machine) can simulate a Turing machine. e channel can trivially store the content of a Turing machine tape, and the automaton can simulate the transitions of the machine. is can be used to easily show that in the absence of reverting the isolation problem over ordered channels is undecidable even when there is only one host, and one middlebox with a self loop.
When reverting is possible, we add auxiliary packet type and middlebox states. Whenever in initial state, the middlebox sends a special packet over its self loop, and discards all arrived packets until it receives the special packet 2 .
is empties the self loop from its content, which intuitively, resets the tape of the Turing machine. Hence, when the middlebox reverts, so does the Turing machine. us, the isolation property is violated if and only if the Turing machine reaches an accepting state, and the undecidability proof follows. P L . 4.6. e proof relies on the reverting property and on the fact that the channels are unordered.
Let σ 0 be a reachable con guration in which p occurs in e, and let s 0 be the scenario that led to it, i.e., the sequence of events that took place. Consider an arbitrary run (scenario) π . One can extend π with the following scenario: First all the middleboxes return to their initial state. Second, scenario s 0 occur, i.e., only packets from scenario s 0 are processed, and the other packets are ignored. is extension is possible because the channels are unordered.
To construct a scenario in which e contains n copies of p, we just concatenate the above mentioned extension n time. P L . 4.7. Let (p 1 , . . . , p ) be the sequence of packets that m processed from the latest reset until it arrives to state σ m in the given witness scenario.
Consider an arbitrary run. By Lem. 4.6 we can extend this run such that p 1 , . . . , p are pending packets in the ingress channel of middlebox m and p is pending in e (if some of the packets occur more than once in the sequence, then by the same lemma we may assume that there are multiple copies of those packets).
We further extend the run with a reset event for middlebox m. Finally, we extend the scenario such that in the next steps m will process p 1 , . . . , p reaching state σ m . P T . 4.5. We prove that if the number of queries in a middlebox is not a constant (i.e., it depends on other parameters of the problem), then the safety problem is coNP-hard even when the network consists of only one middlebox and one host. e proof is by reduction from the Boolean unsatis ability problem of propositional formulas.
Given a formula ϕ with n variables x 1 , . . . , x n we construct a network with one host and one middlebox m, such that m has only one port, connected to h. e packet types are x 1 , ¬x 1 , . . . , x n , ¬x n , i.e., there are 2n packet types, and only if ϕ is satis able. We note that possible resets do not a ect the safety of the network. P T . 5.5. In order to prove completeness it is enough to show that every application of the best abstract transformer results in an abstract value that is less or equal than the result of applying the abstraction function on the concrete least xed point (i.e., the reachable states of the network w.r.t unordered reverting packet state space semantic). e proof is by induction over n, the number of times we apply the transformer. e proof for n = 0 is trivial. For n > 1, let p,p and m be packets and a middlebox. By the induction hypothesis for every packet state ∈ ω 1 (m)(p) there is a concrete reachable middlebox state such that the state of m over packetp is and for every packet p ∈ ω 2 (e) there is a reachable concrete con guration where p is in e. Hence, by Lem. 4.8, there exists a concrete reachable con guration in which p is in e and the state of m over packetp is . erefore, by de nition of ω 1 and ω 2 , every new state in ω 1 (m)(p) \ ω 1 (m)(p) has a corresponding concrete reachable state, and likewise for any new pending packet in ω 2 (e) \ ω(2). e proof is complete.
L . 5.7. e direction from le to right is trivial, as the reverting semantics is a sound approximation, hence a computation leading to error when S is non-reverting also exists when S is reverting. In order to prove the converse direction we assume that err N i\S pa and prove that all the computations of N i pa are safe. e proof is straightforward. We observe that for every computation s in N i pa there is a corresponding computation in N i\S pa which is identical to s other than the behavior of the safety middleboxes (this is because safety middleboxes do not a ect forwarding of packets). Consider a safety middlebox m and an arbitrary step k in the computation. Let p 1 , . . . , p be the sequence of packets that m processed until step i and let p r , . . . , p be the packets it processed since it last reverted.
Since err N i\S pa it follows that in particular the middlebox m is not in err state. As m is revert-robust and p r , . . . , p is a su x of p 1 , . . . , p , then m is also not in err state in N i pa (where it may revert). us, we get that for every s, k and m, the middlebox m is not in err state. Hence, err N i pa and the proof is completed.
B THE SEMANTICS OF AMDL
In this section, we de ne two semantics for middleboxes-the one based on relation states and the one based packet states. We then prove that both semantics are bisimilar.
A Note on Field Binding. A pblock construct binds the atoms in a packet received on a channel to eld names before executing a guarded commands. We will assume that there is at most one pblock construct per incoming channel. is assumption does not impose a restriction, since two pblock constructs ch ? (f 1 , . . . , f k ) ⇒ gc 1 and ch ? ( 1 , . . . , k ) ⇒ gc 2 over the same channel ch can be automatically merged into a single pblock construct via the source-to-source transformation
where the eld names of the second pblock construct are substituted appropriately for the eld names of the rst pblock construct. (Technically, the transformation rst extends the sequence of atoms of the pblock construct with fewer
. . , f j k )]]p def = (a j 1 , . . . , a j k ) p = (a 1 , . . . , a k ) number of atoms by adding dummy atoms.) is assumption allows us to access the atom a i of the incoming packet by indexing into the sequence of elds, as f i .
B.1 Relation State Semantics
We start by de ning a big-step semantics for relation states.
Let m be a xed middlebox.
For simplicity of the presentation, we consider the case where P def = (H × H × T ) denotes the set of all packets. ( e adaptation to other de nitions of the packets space is straightforward.) Let C m denote the set of channels of m. We de ne the sequence of pairs of packets and channels to be sent following a transition of the middlebox m on every channel as Cont def = (P × C m ) * . e semantics of guarded commands, actions, conditions, and atoms is given in the context of a middlebox state s ∈ Σ[m] = rels(m) → ℘(D(m)) and a packet p.
We start by de ning in Fig. 8 A guarded command accepts a middlebox state, an assignment of elds to values, and a mapping from output channels to their output content (i.e., the sequences of packets that should be delivered to them). It returns the updated state, the (same) assignment of elds to values, and the new mapping from channels to content. To prove bisimulation, we use induction on the derivation trees. Since the shape of all rules, except the ones shown in Fig. 10 , is exactly the same, we only need to demonstrate bisimilarity for them.
Notice that the semantics is strict in err-the derivation rules for err propagate err and query evaluations return False.
We therefore, focus only on the cases where the states are di erent from err. Assume p = (a 1 , . . . , a k ) and a = (f 1 , . . . , f k ). = λp ∈ P . λq ∈ Q(m). atoms(q)(p) ∈ {R[[a]]p}, rel(q) = r ; atoms(q)(p) ∈ s(rel(q)), else.
= λp ∈ P . λq ∈ Q(m). atoms(q)(p) = R[[a]]p, rel(q) = r ; atoms(q)(p) ∈ s(rel(q)), else.
= λp ∈ P . λq ∈ Q(m).
True, rel(q) = r ∧ atoms(q)(p) = a(p); atoms(q)(p) ∈ s(rel(q)), else.
True, rel(q) = r ∧ atoms(q)(p) = a(p); s(p)(q), else. (using 1) = update(s, r, a, True) (update(s, r , a, True) , p, send) .
We will use the following identity, which we obtain from the de nition ofs: s(p)(q) = (λp ∈ P . λq ∈ Q(m). atoms(q)(p) ∈ s(rel(q)))(p)(q) = atoms(q)(p) ∈ s(rel(q)) .
(1)
We have to show that the following relation holds in Fig. 11 s(rel(q) ), else.
= λp ∈ P . λq ∈ Q(m). atoms(q)(p) R[[a]]p, rel(q) = r ; atoms(q)(p) ∈ s(rel(q)), else.
False, rel(q) = r ∧ atoms(q)(p) = a(p); atoms(q)(p) ∈ s(rel(q)), else.
False, rel(q) = r ∧ atoms(q)(p) = a(p); s(p)(q), else. (using 1) = update(s, r , a, False) 
